

8/4/1943

DOC. NO.  
1250-A

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Total No.: 23849

Coded Telegram from London to the Foreign Ministry

Despatched: Afternoon August 5, 1940  
Received: Afternoon August 6, 1940

TO: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA  
FROM: Ambassador SHIGEMITSU

Telegram 1356 (Code used by Head of Embassy)

Please accept my hearty congratulations for the establishment and enforcement of the Greater East Asia Policy at this time. In this connection, I wish to inform you of the following points which have occurred to me though there may be parts that duplicate what I have already told you:

1. In the present situation, it is better, in regard to our attitude towards Germany and Italy to push forward an independent parallel policy. As to the extent of its application, it seems to me that the way the Soviet Union is carrying out its parallel policy will be of value.

Italy's policy of Alliance was based on geographical necessity, but Italy will generally maintain a merely subordinate position to Germany in future. As Japan is in a very advantageous geographical position, and as her object is to establish a position in the world, I think it is fundamentally essential to secure independence of policy. Next, in order to establish our position in Greater East Asia, it would be necessary to consider measures for gaining the maximum benefits at the minimum loss by carrying them out at the direct expense of small nations (for instance - France or Portugal) (although indirectly, it may turn out to be at the expense of Britain and America) and by avoiding conflict with other countries so as not to make many enemies at once but to dispose of them one by one.

2. The Soviet Union, by means of its parallel policy towards Germany occupied the Baltic area and East Europe, compromised (with Germany and Italy) in the Balkans and is supposed to be about to advance towards Iran, Turkey and Iraq, (or perhaps also secure a position in Finland). But she is always standing strongly for neutrality, trying to avoid conflict with the big countries, such as Britain (and France), etc. but extending her power over minor countries which have no connection with the war. Actually, the Soviet Union is aiming at a thorough shake-up of the British dominions but it seems to be exercising all the skill at its command to realize the greatest gains at the least loss, while always leaving room for compromise with Britain.

3. The unavoidable diplomatic retreat of Britain from East Europe and the Black Sea area and the same ~~developments~~ in Asia, namely, the transfer of the center of the British sphere of influence from Shanghai to Hongkong some time ago, and then from Hongkong to Singapore, gives some idea of it. Britain is also changing her fundamental policy toward China. Even in the case of America, its strict adherence to the Monroe Doctrine signifies an attitude of retreat from East Asia. And the embargoes on oil and scrap-iron represent not a positive but a negative policy which is defensive (or obstructionist). The policies of Britain and America are not joint, but parallel policies but they have not necessarily been completely in accord hitherto as to their purpose and application. That depends upon our attitude. If we carry out our Greater East Asia policy with a reasonable, fair and square attitude, we may properly expect Anglo-American obstructions to be removed in the natural course of events. As to our attitude toward Britain and America, we need to consider fully the actual benefits, while considering at the same time our principles and position.

4. Here we should be on our guard against the fact that there are active, powerful movements afoot to draw Japan into a conflict with Britain and America in the Pacific Ocean thereby precipitating an uncontrollable situation in the Pacific just as Japan was drawn into the China problem by the Lukowkiao Incident, which they could expand into a world war, so that they could fish in troubled waters. In Britain and America, this movement is represented by the reinforcement of the existing anti-Japanese movement sponsored by the Leftists. The other one is a movement to draw Japan into a conflict by making Japan provoke Britain and America. Both movements have the same direct objective, though they differ in their ultimate objectives.

5. In short, though the main object of our policy is to establish a powerful political and economic position in Greater East Asia, I believe that to show a liberal-minded attitude towards settling the China problem expresses, not weakness, but strength on our part. In view of our present high international position, it would be improper for us to be victimized by other countries, not to speak of adopting an attitude of supplication or subordination. I believe it to be the cardinal principle of diplomacy to assert what our country requires and believes, and at the same time to prevent untoward losses in complicated diplomatic relations and to devise all available means towards every country alike within the limits of their potential utility. Needless to say, it is necessary to sweeten our relations with the Soviet Union and also to proceed with scrupulous consideration and prudence in our relations with Britain and America.

(3rd)  
Transmitted to America, Germany and Italy.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1250-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 5 August, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram from Ambassador SHIGEMITSU to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18th day of Sept. 1946.

s/K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Nagaharu OdoOfficial CapacityStatement of Official Procurement

I. Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
19th day of Sept., 1946

Witness: s/ T/4 P. Toguchis/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAMEInvestigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

電 信 簿  
番号二三八四九  
號暗傳  
昭和十五年八月五日  
平省  
昭和十五年八月六日  
管主

松岡外務大臣

重光大使

第一三五六號（館長符號板）

今回大東亜政局ヲ確立實行セラル、ニ對シ満洲ノ徵  
意ヲ表ス右ニ記シ此ノ際左ノ點（從來ノ電報ト重複  
スル嫌アルモ）氣附ノ管印添ス

一、今日ノ形勢ニ於テハ我態度ハ勿伊ニ對シテハ勿  
自ノ並行政策遂行可然ク其ノ程度運用ニ付テ  
ハ蘇聯ノ並行政策ノ遣口ハ非常ニ參事トナルト  
思ハル

伊國ノ同盟政策ハ伊國ノ地理上已ムヲ得サルニ  
出テタルモノナルモ伊國ハ將來發達ニ對シテハ  
大体進歩的地位ヲ保ツニ過キス日本ハ更メテ有  
利ナル地理的地位ヲ有シ又世界ニ於ケル地位ヲ  
建設スルコトカ目的ナルニ付根本ニ於テ政策ノ  
獨自性ヲ確保スルコトカ要點ナリト考フ次テ大  
東亜ニ於ケル我地位ヲ建設スルニハ直接ニハ小  
國（僑國或ハ葡）ノ犠牲ニ於テ行ヒ（間接ニハ  
英米側ノ犠牲トナルヘキモ）他國トノ衝突ヲ避  
ケ一時ニ相手ヲ多クセス各個處分ノ方策ヲ以テ  
最少限度ノ措置ヲ以テ擴大ノ利益ヲ收ムルコト  
ヲ考慮スル要アラン

10/23

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二、 蔡錦ハ獨トノ並行政家ニ依リ「バルト」東歐ヲ  
盤略シ巴爾幹ニ於テ之（獨か）ト安撫シ次ニ「  
イラン」土耳其「イフク」方面へ或ヘ芬蘭ノ地  
位ヲモ固ムト恩ハルニ向フモノト察ヤラルル  
モ常ニ其（俄）ノ大國トノ宣伝衝突ヲ避ケツツ  
也ク中立ヲ標榜シ戰爭ニ關係ナキ小國ニ對シテ  
其ノ權益ヲ擴張シツ、アリ結局ハ英國ノ植民地  
ノ根本的動搖ニ向ツテ進ミツ、アルモ常ニ英國  
ニ對シテ安撫ノ余地ヲ存シツ、是少限度ノ損害  
ニ於テ最大ノ効果ヲ畢ケント虚々實々ノ苦心ヲ  
爲シ居ルカ如シ

三、 英國カ東歐黒海方面ヨリノ外交的退却ヲ余儀ナ  
クヤラレ又東亞方面ヨリモ同様ノ狀態ニシテ較  
ニ其ノ勢力中心ヲ上海ヨリ香港ニ有シ更ニ又香  
港ヨリ新嘉坡ニ移スニ至リタルハ其ノ間ノ消息  
ヲ物語ルモノニシテ其ノ對支政策ノ根本モ變更  
シツ、アリ米國ト雖「モンロー」主義擴張堅持  
ハ東亞方面ヨリ退却ノ姿勢ヲ意味シ石油脅餉ノ  
牽制モ畢竟延シテ其ヲ藉ヘントスル轉變政策ニ  
アラスシテ防禦（老クハ妨害）手段ケル消極政策  
ナリ英米ノ政策ヘ共同（「ジヨイント」）政策  
ニアラスシテ平行（「バラレル」）政策ナル  
モ右平行政策モ今日迄ノ所必シモ目的及運用ニ

付完全ニ一轍シ居ラス右ハ我方ノ態度ニ關ル所  
ナルカ我方ニ於テ條理ト且正々堂々タル態度ヲ  
以テ大東亜政策ヲ遂行スルニハ英米ヨリノ監督  
ハ自然ニ除カレ行クモノト見テ然ルヘシ英米ニ  
對スル我方ノ態度ハ尙主義及立場ヲ問題トスル  
必要アルト同時に貿易ノ點ヲ充分ニ考慮スルヲ  
要スヘシ

四、茲ニ注意ヲ要スルハ太平洋ニ於テ日本ト英米ト  
ヲ衝突ニ導キ以テ恰モ立場事件ヨリ支那問題  
ニ對シテ日本ヲ引込ミタルト同シク太平洋ニ於  
テ收拾シ倦サル事態ヲ諭出シ以れ戰爭ヲ世界戰  
争トシ其ノ間ニ至大ナル益夫ノ利ヲ占メントス  
ル有力ナル運動済激ニ行ハレ居ル點ナリ右ハ英  
米ニ於テハ左翼ヲ中心トスル在來ノ反日運動ノ  
強化ニシテ他ハ成可ク日本ヲソテ英米ヲ撲滅セ  
シメテ衝突ニ導カントスル運動ナリ何レモ終局  
ノ目的ニハ豈アルモ直接ノ目的ハ一致シ居レリ

五、要スルニ大東亜ニ於ケル政治的經濟的ニ實力ア  
ル地位ヲ建設スルカ我政策ノ眞目ナルモ之ニ付  
テハ支那問題ハ矢張り大キナ處ニテ結束ヲ着ク  
ルノ態度ヲ示スハ我方ノ意味ニアラスシテ事ロ  
我意味ヲ表示スル譯ト思ヘル我今日ノ六ナル國  
際的地位ニ鑑ミ他國ニ對シ哀願方シクハ追従的

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憲政ハ勿論他國ヨリ惡用セラルハ不可ニシテ  
國家ノ要求スル所真ノ信スル所ニ向ツテ主張ヲ  
爲スト共ニ被經ナル國際關係ニ於テ不専ノ實張  
署ヲ防キ何レノ國ニ對シテモ之ヲ利用シ得ル範  
國內ニ於テハ凡ユル手段ヲ講スルコト外交上要  
諭ト信セラル對蘇關係ヲ緩和シ對英米關係ニ就  
テモ周到ト考慮ト用意トヲ以テ進ムコト素ヨリ  
必要ト思考セラル（三日）  
米、獨、伊ヘ轉電セリ

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證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第一三五〇ノ<sup>A</sup> 號  
國 際 檢 察 部 第 一 二 五〇 ノ<sup>A</sup> 號

真摯及ビ公正ニ認スル証明

余、林 稔ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省  
文書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルキノ  
ナルコト、茲ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ其ニ添附ヤラレ  
タル、四頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十年ノ昭和十五年八  
月五日附、下記題名、即チ在天皇光大使暨松岡  
外相宛電報ノ文書ノ係官ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ証  
明ハ。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記載及ビ文書方日本政府ノ公文書  
ナルコト、茲ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ管又ハ部局ノ公式  
書類及ビ證ノ一冊ナルコトヲ証明ス。 (米シアラバ  
綴書號又ヘ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ヘ該ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所  
在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年九月十八日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄 林 稔

右ノ者ノ公的資格 外務省文書課長  
證 人長戸長春

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公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、リチャード・エッチ・ラッシュ  
Richard H. Larsh ハ、余ガ聯合國最高指  
揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、茲ニ上記題  
名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨ  
リ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

一千九百四十六年／昭和二十二年／九月十九日

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